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The objective of this study is to examine the effect of downsizing on corporate performance, considering 
a sample of manufacturing firms drawn from the Spanish Survey of Business Strategies during the 1993-
2005 period. No significant differences in post-downsizing performance arise between companies which 
downsize and those that do not. Likewise, we find that substantial workforce reductions through 
collective dismissals do not either lead to improved performance levels. Downsizing, therefore, may not 
be a way for managers to increase performance, particularly in a context like the Spanish one, where the 
labour market is characterized by a high protection of employees’ rights and substantial contract 
termination costs. 
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1. Introduction 
Downsizing involves permanent and intentional reductions in the workforce (Freeman 
and Cameron, 1993). In spite of having been particularly used by American 
corporations (Budros, 1999; Cascio, 1998), it has also become a common feature both 
in European countries (Filatochev et al., 2000; Vicente-Lorente and Suarez-Gonzalez, 
2007) and in some emerging countries (Ahmadjian and Robinson, 2001; Lee, 1997). 
Literature on this issue has centred not only on its causes (e.g., Mckinley et al., 2000; 
Vicente-Lorente and Suarez-Gonzalez, 2007), but also on the strategies implemented to 
reduce the labour force (Cameron, 1994; DeWitt, 1993) as well as its consequences 
(Cascio et al., 1997; De Meuse et al., 2004).  
As regards the latter, a variety of methods and datasets have been used. While 
some works have provided evidence of the stock market reaction to downsizing (Lee, 
1997; Worrel et al., 2001), others have focused on the effect of downsizing on 
profitability (Cascio et al., 1997; DeMeuse et al., 2004). On the whole, however, there is 
no general consensus so far on the performance implications of downsizing. While one 
research stream has found downsizing to improve economic performance (Espahbodi et 
al., 2001; Yu and Park, 2006), another has shown its effects to be either negative or null 
(Cascio et al., 1997; Morris et al., 1999). Therefore, as the performance implications of 
this widely-used practice remain an unresolved issue, more evidence on the relationship 
between downsizing and financial performance is needed. 
The present paper contributes to amplify our knowledge on the relationship 
between downsizing and financial performance in Spain. Up to our knowledge, this 
issue has been examined scarcely in this country (e.g. Suarez, 2001) —literature has so 
far focused either on examining either the determinants of a firm’s decision to downsize 
or the extent of downsizing (e.g., Magan and Cespedes, 2007; Vicente-Lorente and 
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Suárez-González 2007; Requejo 1996). We compare the performance of a sub-sample 
of downsizing companies to that of a sub-sample of non-downsizing companies over the 
period 1993-2005 (Cascio, 1998; Chen et al., 2001). We also investigate whether or not 
the implementation of collective dismissals —i.e., reductions in at least 10 percent of 
the permanent workforce— has any significant impact on corporate performance 
(Cascio et al., 1997; De Meuse et al., 2004). For this purpose, we use survey data for 
Spanish manufacturing firms drawn from the Survey on Business Strategies —Encuesta 
sobre Estrategias Empresariales or ESEE, hereafter— which comprises relevant 
corporate characteristics which might be driving corporate performance.  
Exploring the relationship between downsizing and corporate performance is 
particularly relevant in Spain. On the one hand, in this country evidence indicates that 
almost 50% of companies downsized between 1989 and 1994 (Suarez, 1999) and that a 
substantial number of companies announced reductions of their workforce during the 
1995-2001 period (Sánchez and Suarez, 2003). On the other hand, the Spanish labour 
market is characterized by a high protection of employees’ rights. Critics of labour 
market regulation have claimed that strong job rights prevent employers from adjusting 
to economic fluctuations and secular changes in demand. It has also been alleged that, 
by inhibiting layoffs during downturns, strong job security provisions reduce 
employers’ willingness to hire during upturns and thereby contribute to unemployment 
(OECD, 1986). However, the effects of job security regulations on corporate financial 
performance are still an unresolved issue. Thus, our study contributes to the downsizing 
literature by exploring a new institutional context (Spain), which has a markedly 
different labour market from other countries —particularly, compared to the United 
States, whose labour relations system is characterized by flexibility to hire and fire. For 
this reason, the specific characteristics of the Spanish labour market may lead to 
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insights different from the ones found by previous research focusing on other 
institutional settings. 
The paper is organized as follows. The next section reviews the relationship 
between downsizing and corporate performance. Section 3 reviews the institutional 
context in which the present study has been undertaken. Section 4 describes the 
methodology and section 5 presents the empirical evidence. Finally, we indicate the 
main conclusions. 
2. Theoretical approach: The financial impact of downsizing 
Despite the growth of downsizing —this practice has been prominent in the United 
States (Chen et al., 2001; De Meuse et al., 2004; Morris et al., 1999), and has also 
recently become relevant in other contexts such as Canada (Mentzer, 1996), Japan (Lee, 
1997), or Korea (Yu and Park, 2006)—  controversy surrounding its benefits still 
persists. On the one hand, since downsizing eliminates redundancies and reduces 
employment costs, many executives believe that this practice helps firms to compete 
efficiently and improve profitability (Cascio et al., 1997; Cascio and Young, 2003; 
Morris et al., 1999): “The objective of downsizing is to improve the organizational 
efficiency, productivity and/or competitiveness” (Freeman and Cameron, 1993:12). 
That is, a body of research supports the idea that corporations may obtain higher post-
downsizing performance through downsizing. For instance, the works by Espahbodi et 
al. (2000) and Chen et al. (2001) show that profitability of American firms improves 
subsequently to downsizing announcements. Likewise, empirical evidence in other 
countries supports the same conclusion (see, e.g., Yu and Park, 2006, for Korean firms). 
On the other hand, however, downsizing may not result in improved 
profitability. “Downsizing is not enough. The reduction of staff, which could be the 
equivalent of corporate anorexia, can slim down a firm, but it doesn’t necessarily make 
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it healthier” (Hamel and Prahalad, 1995: 29). Several studies support this conclusion 
that employee reduction does not necessarily have a positive impact on organizational 
performance. For instance, for the United States, Cascio et al. (1997) found that 
downsizing practices carried out along the 1980s and early 1990s were unable to 
improve corporate profitability. Cascio (1998) again found that companies which had 
implemented downsizing between 1981 and 1990 did not enjoy larger financial 
performance. In an extension of this research since 2000, Cascio and Young (2003) 
showed that downsizers enjoyed lower profitability than stable employers or upsizers in 
the two years subsequent to the announcement of layoffs. Other studies on American 
corporations (Krishnnan and Park, 1998; Morris et al., 1999; Vanderheiden et al., 1999) 
also showed that downsizing did not lead to improved financial performance. For 
example, De Meuse et al. (2004) finds that financial performance of companies which 
downsized did not significantly differed from non-downsizers. Similarly, Mentzer 
(1996) found that downsizing was not associated with better corporate performance 
among Canadian firms. 
An explanation for these findings is that downsizing may not be managed 
effectively. Indeed, learning how to downsize effectively is important not only for 
companies experiencing difficulties, but also as a proactive strategy for healthy 
organizations (Bruton, Keels and Shook, 1996; Cameron, Freeman and Mishra, 1991; 
Greengard, 1993; Hitt et al., 1994).  Embarking on downsizing without learning how to 
do it well leads to several kinds of problems. The loss of vital organizational memory is 
one of the negative and expensive effects firms have suffered in downsizing. If 
managers do not think and plan ahead, their companies risk losing key skills and 
experiences as well as valuable knowledge when employees are moved out of their 
working units or leave the organization entirely (Hitt et al., 1994:25)
i
. 
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A further typical negative effect of downsizing reported in the research is that “it can 
foster an organization so preoccupied with bean counting, so anxious about where the 
ax will fall next, that employees become narrow minded, self-absorbed, and risk averse” 
(Henkoff, 1990:26). The ability of employees to continue to work well is likely to be 
severely curtailed in such stressful situations (Heckscher, 1995; Hitt et al., 1994:24), 
and they tend to be even less able to innovate and learn (Brockner, 1988).  
Therefore, the most significant conclusion drawn by studies of experiences in U.S. 
corporations is that downsizing must be regarded as something firms have to actively 
learn how to do well. Instead of conceiving downsizing to be “a one-time, quick-fix 
solution” (Cascio, 1993:103), a comprehensive framework is required, a whole process 
of grappling with the underlying problems and developing a range of activities to both 
restructure the organization and enable employees to make the transition to different 
jobs within or outside the organization (Applebaum, 1991; Bruton, Keels and Shook, 
1996; Cameron, Freeman and Mishra, 1991). For instance, the literature reports that a 
frequent mistake is to overlook the effects on “survivors” of the downsizing process, 
particularly of layoffs (Rubach, 1995). These employees have been found to experience 
fear of losing their job, guilt for still having it while former colleagues may be 
unemployed, anger at the organization that did this to them, and exhaustion from 
overload (Caplan and Teese, 1997).  
In sum, firms who fail to manage the downsizing process appropriately are less likely to 
make poor or incorrect decisions that lead to letting the wrong people go or failing to 
make significant enough cuts to have an effect.  
3. The Spanish institutional background 
Recent works have witnessed that contextual conditions may influence the adoption of 
different types of human resource management practices in general, and employment 
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strategies in particular (Gooderham et al., 1999; Nickell, 1997). Therefore, as Yu and 
Park (2006: 231) addressed “it would be interesting to see how different institutional 
settings affect the performance effect of the downsizing practices differently”.  
In this section we briefly review the procedures for employee reductions by 
employers in Spain. The costs of reducing employment are affected by the institutional 
setting and legislation introduced to protect workers against unfair dismissals. Thus, the 
rules regarding individual and collective dismissals
ii
 and the use by firms of both early 
retirement and voluntary severance programmes are important in explaining the costs of 
adjustment for firms.  
Worker dismissals 
There are two basic ways through which any employer may adjust its workforce: (i) not 
renewing temporary contracts; and (ii) dismiss, either individually or collectively, some 
of its permanent workers.  As regards the latter, a contract for an indefinite period may 
only be terminated, under Spanish law, according to legally defined causes and an 
unfair dismissal can be very expensive for the employer in comparison to the European 
average. Indeed, if an employer terminates such contract without good cause (see 
below) the employee will be entitled to receiving a severance compensation based on 45 
days of salary per year of service in the company capped at 3 and ½ years of salary 
(which corresponds to more than 28 years of service). 
On the one hand, if the size of the adjustment is large enough —meaning 
roughly 10 percent of the workforce— it may initiate a procedure called Expediente de 
regulacion de empleo. This procedure has to be negotiated between the firm and the 
workers, including the amount of severance pay (for which the law only establishes a 
minimum). Redundancy payments in Spain are calculated at 20 days’ pay per year of 
service, up to a maximum of 12 months’ pay. Likewise, when a collective (or objective) 
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dismissal is found to be unjustified, the compensation amounts to 45 days’ pay —except  
for “promotion contracts” when the unfairly dismissed worker receives the equivalent of 
33 days’ pay. 
On the other hand, if the size of the required adjustment does not meet the 
criteria to be considered collective, firms may initiate an individual dismissal procedure 
which may take the form of (i) an “objective” dismissal —meaning a dismissal on the 
grounds of economic or technological circumstances; i.e., objectively justified— or (ii) 
a disciplinary dismissal. Disciplinary dismissals are usually preferred by firms because 
there are fewer requirements involved (no advance notice is required and no initial 
severance payment has to be deposited; however, the employer faces a financial risk in 
case of a disciplinary dismissal to be unfair of 45 days of salary per year of service). In 
objective dismissals, if the motives for dissolving the contract are accredited, the 
severance paid to the employee should be equivalent to 20 days’ salary per year worked, 
up to a maximum of one year’s pay—otherwise, if the company can not accredit the 
reason for the termination, or breaches the formal and procedural communication 
requisites, it will have to opt to either pay the employee severance pay equivalent to 45 
days’ salary per year worked, up to a maximum of 42 monthly payments, or to readmit 
the employee under the conditions in place prior to dismissal.  
Early retirement and voluntary severance packages  
Early retirement is currently observed in a number of European countries, not all: the 
average rate of activity in the age group 55-64 ranges from 24 percent in Belgium to 88 
percent in Iceland (Pestian et. al., 2006). In Spain, the Law contemplates two early 
retirement formulae: early retirement at the age of 52 and reduced-rate early retirement 
— while others form the subject of collective bargaining.  
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As a means to adjust employment, early retirement is rather widespread 
nowadays. It is only scarcely the result of a voluntary decision by the worker; instead, it 
is a frequent consequence of employment adjustment processes. Pensions are usually 
reduced in an extent dependent on both workers’ labour market experience and their 
distance to the statutory retirement age (65 years-old). However, these agreements cover 
the possibility that in the event of crisis accords or “social plans” —created in order to 
manage and cushion the consequences of collective dismissals or in the case of 
collective contracts involving firms affected by over-manning— the employer may 
agree to pay a sum equivalent to the old age pension, until the worker reaches the age of 
65, a system quite common in Spain (Toharia and Ojeda, 1999). Thus, these incentives 
induce elderly workers to exit the labour force before they reach the age of 65, and 
serve to protect workers who get jobless when firms implement collective dismissals. In 
fact, it is frequent for dismissed individuals in case of being above 52 years-old and 
after the exhaustion of contributory unemployment benefits, to be entitled to receiving 
assistance benefits up to the early retirement age
iii
.  
Apart from early retirement programmes (which are frequently offered in 
restructuring, since employers are obliged by law to offer measures designed to alleviate 
its social effects), negotiated alternatives between companies and work councils may 
include part-time work programmes, transfers to other locations of the same firm and 
“voluntary severance programmes”. The use of voluntary departures as a means to 
cushioning redundancy is extremely widespread (there is no age limit established). 
Voluntary severance incentives are offered to reduce head count through self-selection. 
These incentives can include continuation of compensation for a specified period of 
time, a one time lump-sum payment or maintenance of certain benefits paid for by the 
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company. Benefits often consist of life or health insurance, memberships, educational 
assistance and so on.  
4. Methods 
4.1. Data 
The present study utilizes a large firm-level panel of data compiled by the Spanish 
Ministry of Science and Technology since 1990: the Survey of Business Strategies 
(ESEE) for the years 1993 to 2005. The ESEE covers a wide range of Spanish 
manufacturing firms operating in all industries. The sample is representative of Spanish 
manufacturing firms having from 10 to 200 employees; it is probabilistic, and stratified 
by industry and firm size (in terms of the number of employees). In addition, the ESEE 
provides relevant corporate parameters that might be driving corporate performance. 
Most importantly, as of 1992, several questions regarding changes in workforce size 
were included in the survey. From the original sample, a number of firms have been 
eliminated, most of them for the lack of relevant data (in particular, if employment data 
were unavailable for the year of the analysis and the prior year, we excluded the 
company from the sample for that year). Finally, every independent variable is one-
year-lagged with respect to the dependent variable to control for simultaneity and 
endogeneity. Consequently, the sample size is reduced owing to missing data for the 
first year (1993). 
 
Thus, our final dataset is an unbalanced panel of data of 17,645 (firm-
year) observations (and 2,053 companies). 
4.2. Variables 
Dependent variable: financial performance 
Different measures of economic performance may be used. For instance, stock prices 
(Hallock, 1998; Worrel et al., 1991), or financial accounting outcomes (Cascio et al., 
1997; De Meuse et al., 1994). Recently, Yu and Park (2006: 236) indicated that “it is 
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difficult to nail down the downsizing effect form stock market reactions because too 
many external variables other than downsizing affect capital market performance in 
firms. Also, since some downsizing practices tend to be implemented by firms in 
financial difficulty, the stock market would react negatively to downsizing as a sign of 
bad performance in those firms”. Therefore, we decided to use financial accounting 
outcomes. In particular, we use both the return on assets (ROA) and the return on sales 
(ROS), consistent with most prior literature on downsizing (Cascio et al., 1997; 
DeMeuse et al., 2004; Krishnan and Park, 1998). ROA is computed by dividing 
operating income before depreciation, interest and taxes by assets (Cascio and Young, 
2003; Morris et al., 1999), whereas ROS is measured as profits divided by sales. 
Finally, the value added per employee (value added/total number of employees) was 
used as an additional performance measure. This allows us to examine the impact of 
downsizing on organizational performance (i.e., employee productivity), apart from 
financial performance (profitability) —see, in this respect, Yu and Park (2006: 238).  
Independent variable: downsizing 
Downsizing is defined as the reduction in the number of employees under open-ended 
contracts from one year (year of dowsizing or year 0) to the following year (year 1), in 
line with the approach of previous works (e.g., Cascio et al., 1997). We exclude 
reductions in temporary workers because we regard downsizing as a permanent 
reduction in the company’s workforce, which distinguishes this practice from temporary 
job fluctuation (see Freeman and Cameron, 1993). Therefore, we consider that a firm 
downsizes during a given year if the number of employees under open-ended contracts 
decrease from the previous year to the current year.  Since our dataset collects the size 
of permanent work force at the end of each year, it is straightforward to operationalize 
the latter’s percent variability from year t-1 to year t
iv
. 
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As an assessment of the robustness of our findings, we also repeated the 
estimations defining downsizing as reductions of at least 10 percent of the permanent 
workforce during any given year (De Meuse et al., 2004). This threshold helps 
distinguish between individual and collective dismissals in Spain (see Section 2 above) 
and ensures that downsizing implies a significant reduction in employment (Bruton et 
al., 1996; Freeman and Cameron, 1993).  
Control variables  
We include several control variables which may influence the relationship between 
downsizing and corporate performance.  
Size. Firm size affects the association between downsizing and performance (Chadwick 
et al., 2004; Yu and Park, 2006). For example, Cascio and Young (2003: 132) indicated 
that small companies, especially small manufacturers, tend to resist layoffs because they 
are trying to project the substantial investments they made in finding and training 
workers. Total firm sales are included to control for any size effects (Krishnan and Park, 
1998). 
Diversification and internationalization. Several studies have examined the 
relationship between diversification and performance, obtaining contradictory results. 
Some authors find a linear association between both variables (Hamilton and Shergill, 
1993; Hoskisson et al., 1993; Mayer and Whittington, 2003), whereas others suggest a 
curvilinear model (Palich et al., 2000).  We use a dummy variable to indicate if firm 
diversifies (it equals 1 if the firm diversifies, either through related or unrelated 
diversification). In addition, as internationalization may affect firm performance (see, 
e.g., Hitt et al., 1997; Lu and Beamish, 2004; Ruigrok et al., 2007), we have included a 
dummy variable which takes on the value 1 if the firm has expanded its activities 
towards foreign markets (and 0 otherwise). 
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Liquidity. We use a standard measure of liquidity —the current ratio; i.e., the ratio of 
current assets to current liabilities. Prior literature has shown liquidity to have some 
effects on firm performance (Chang, 1996).  
Leverage. Since prior evidence suggests that leverage affects performance (Hamilton 
and Shergill, 1993; Mayer and Whittington, 2003), we take the firm’s long-term debt-
to-assets ratio as an indication of its leverage (Hoskisson et al., 1994). 
Research and development. The efforts by the firm in research and development 
(R&D) are captured through a dummy variable which takes the value 1 if the firm 
makes or contracts R&D activities during the year (and 0 otherwise). Several studies 
support the conclusion that R&D influences corporate performance (e.g., Hoskisson et 
al., 1994; Lantz and Sahut, 2005; Morbey and Reithner, 1990).  
Capacity utilization and market demand. In times of weak capacity utilization, 
employers will naturally achieve worse performance (Greenhalgh et al., 1988). Thus, 
we include the firm’s average use of capacity utilization. In addition, we measured the 
trend of demand through a set of dummy variables collecting whether the market 
addressed by the company has enlarged, remained constant or decreased. We also 
include a dummy variable which collects whether the market addressed by the firm is in 
recession. 
Temporality rate. Firms may use fixed-term contracts to adjust to demand fluctuations 
and decrease the turnover of permanent workers simultaneously. This way, firms would 
be taking advantage of the lower dismissal costs associated with the discharge of 
temporary workers when no longer needed (OECD, 2004; Cappelli and Neumark, 2004; 
Kalleberg, 2001). The firm temporality rate is computed by dividing the number of 
workers with temporary workers over the total number of employees. 
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Industry. Differences between trade unions may exist among industries, which may 
lead to larger or smaller levels of profitability. Thus, we control the industry by 
including dummies for twenty categories (see Table 2). 
Year of downsizing. A series of thirteen dichotomous variables were used to control the 
years (1993-2005) associated to each observation. This allows for isolating the effects 
on performance arising from any particular year. 
4. Empirical analysis: The determinants of corporate performance 
To gain confidence in the association between downsizing and corporate performance, it 
is necessary to isolate the effects of downsizing on the firm’s sub-sequent performance. 
This will allow us to check whether or not downsizing in the previous year impacts 
negatively or positively on performance at the current year. The simplest approach to 
address this issue is to estimate the effect that downsizing may have on the performance 
variables. Thus, we regress the three performance measures on the downsizing dummy 
variable and the set of control variables above referred.  
However, unobserved organization attributes lead to bias in the estimation of the 
impact from downsizing. For instance, management decisions will affect corporate 
efficiency. In addition, estimates of the coefficient on the downsizing variable will be 
biased if the error term is correlated with the downsizing variable. Firms with high 
profitability due to unobservables —such as unmeasured inputs, differences in input (or 
output) quality, differences in technology and management decisions— may show a 
larger tendency to downsize, because such intermediaries may be better able to assume 
downsizing costs. The converse might also be true. Companies with low profitability 
due to unobserved characteristics may decide to downsize, given that the downsizing 
may serve to raise corporate performance. As a result, Ordinary Least Squares 
estimation may generate biased parameters. It is therefore necessary to model 
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unobserved attributes statistically. Given that several sequential (yearly) observations of 
the same company are recorded, unobserved variables can be eliminated by specifying a 
fixed effects or a random effects model
v
. More especifically, given the longitudinal data 
on firm’s corporate performance, the effects of downsizing observed for firm i at 
moment t-1 on performance at moment t can be modelled as follows: 
Ln(Pit)= Zit-1 α + λ i + ε it                                                (1) 
where Pit is the firm’s i’s performance associated with the current year; and Zit-1 is a 
vector of observable variables associated with the previous year, which may influence 
firm’s performance at the current year; λi is a time invariant firm specific error that 
captures the effects of unobservable characteristics; and εit is assumed to have constant 
variance and to be uncorrelated across individuals and time. The above model is 
estimated using the within-group (WG) technique, which is equivalent to a simple least 
squares estimation of the model in which the variables are defined as deviations from 
their means. This is the generalisation of the “differences-in-differences” estimation that 
will enable us to recover the effect of downsizing by removing the unobservable firm 
specific effects. The possible correlation between the unobservables and the observables 
is thus accounted for in the estimation of the parameter of interest, α.  
5. Results  
Table 1 shows descriptive statistics (mean and standard deviation) of all the variables in 
the study. The first two columns represent descriptive statistics using the full sample 
(downsizers and non-downsizers). The following four columns show descriptive 
statistics distinguishing between companies that downsize and corporations which do 
not (Table 1 in Appendix summarizes main descriptive statistics considering firms 
which reduce the number of employees in at least 10 per cent or more and firms which 
do not).  
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------------------------------------- 
Insert Table 1 about here 
                                                ------------------------------------- 
According to Table 1, non-downsizers enjoy higher profitability than companies 
which reduce personnel. However, companies which carry out downsizing enjoy the 
largest productivity per employee. Furthermore, firms which do not decide to cut 
employees have a larger proportion of temporary contracts. However, it is the largest 
firms and those with high liquidity ratios the ones that adopt downsizing. We also 
observe that on average around half of the companies in the sample embark on R&D 
activities (especially those that do not reduce employees) and operate in foreign 
markets, and that firms have low levels of diversification. 
Table 2 displays estimation results. As can be observed, neither ROS nor valued-
added per employee are significantly affected by downsizing in the previous year, in 
line with other studies which also address that workforce reductions do not influence 
performance (see, e.g., Krishnan and Park, 1998).  However, when measuring 
performance through ROA, downsizing exerts a negative impact on corporate 
profitability at the current year —which is analogous to findings in previous works 
(e.g., Cascio and Young, 2003).  
------------------------------------- 
Insert Table 2 about here 
                                                ------------------------------------- 
As regards control variables, in the model which includes ROS as the dependent 
variable (Model 1), the coefficients for sales and capacity utilization are significantly 
and positively associated with the performance indicator. On the contrary, the 
coefficient for R&D activities is significantly and negatively associated with ROS. 
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Furthermore, the existence of a non-increasing market for the company is also 
associated with lower performance (as expected). In Model 2, capacity utilization is 
related with performance improvements. However, when firms adopt geographic 
dispersion for their activities and when the market remains constant or decreases, 
performance eventually deteriorates. 
As regards Model 3 (where the value-added per employee is taken as the 
dependent variable), coefficients for sales and capacity utilization are also significantly 
and positively associated with corporate performance. Likewise, in contrast to the 
previous two models, the coefficient for internationalization presents a statistically 
positive significant link with employee productivity. As regards the remainder of 
variables, leverage, R&D activities, diversification and a recessive market are 
associated with reductions in performance. 
Finally, Table 3 presents estimation results concerning the impact of the 
magnitude of workforce reduction on performance. As previously explained, the 
independent variable of interest in this case is whether or not companies reduce 
permanent employment in a magnitude above 10 per cent. As can be observed, no 
statistical significant relationships appears between downsizing and the performance 
indicators. This result is in line with findings from other studies (Cascio et al., 1997; 
Cascio, 1998; De Meuse et al., 1994). As regards control variables, results similar to 
those from Table 2 are obtained (Tables 2 and 3 in the Appendix shows results 
considering the second year following the personnel reduction).  
------------------------------------- 
Insert Table 3 about here 
                                                ------------------------------------- 
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6. Conclusions  
Firms should search for ways to increase their corporate performance. One route to 
achieve this might be through employment downsizing. The assumption is that 
companies seek to save costs with the adjustment of the number of workers. However, 
the downsizing literature has reported inconclusive results with respect to whether or 
not this practice leads to better corporate performance. Using a sample of manufacturing 
Spanish firms, the present study has investigated the financial consequences of 
downsizing (i.e., reductions in the workforce under permanent contracts). This research 
question is a compelling one grabbing the researchers and managers’s attention, because 
the debate about the consequences of employee cuts is unclear, in spite of being a 
widely-used practice by corporations. In order to gain more clarity on the overall 
effectiveness of downsizing, we have considered a new context (Spain) which offers 
some new insights into the international implications of this phenomenon: the Spanish 
labour market is characterized by a high protection of employee’s rights, compared to 
other labour markets. 
We conclude that downsizing does not lead to improved corporate performance, 
since our analysis have shown either null or negative effects of this practice on the 
performance at the first year following the downsizing, which is in line with other 
studies (Cascio and Young, 2003; Morris et al., 1999). Thus, no consistent relationship 
between personnel reductions and performance measures (profitability and productivity) 
is found. In addition, by examining the magnitude of downsizing, we have considered 
the effects on performance arising from substantial changes in permanent employment. 
In this case, our results indicate that by carrying out a deep cut, no significant 
improvements of performance originate either on profitability or on productivity. 
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Therefore, corporations that downsize do not necessarily outperform companies 
which prefer maintaining their workforce levels. Our interpretation of this finding is that 
although downsizing has been encouraged by managers with the purpose of decreasing 
labour cost and improving firm’s performance (Cascio and Young, 2003; Morris et al., 
1999), a dismissal can be very expensive for the employer in Spain in comparison to the 
other countries (e.g. US, UK) average. For example, data reveals that at the end of the 
1990s, an indicator on dismissal costs in Spain amounted to 2.6 in comparison to 0.2 in 
the United States or 0.8 in the United Kingdom (see Layard et al., 1996). Moreover, the 
attitude of “survivors” to downsizing may mitigate the benefits which managers want to 
attain with downsizing (Brocker et al., 1992, 1993; Leana and Feldman, 1992; Mishra 
and Spreitzer, 1998). Therefore, organizational and human costs of insufficiently well-
planned downsizing may be high.  Thus, an implication for both academics and 
practitioners is that in managing downsizing companies must conduct a solid analysis of 
the situation and build a shared need to change before engaging in cutbacks of any kind. 
In particular, since downsizing might become aggressive and traumatic for human 
resources, before implementing it firms should evaluate costs saving and be cautious in 
adopting practices that originate also negative feelings to employees.  
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Table 1. Main Descriptive statistics. Whole sample and sub-samples (downsizers 
versus non-downsizers) 
 
     Whole sample Non-donwsizers Downsizers 
  Mean Std.Dev. Mean Std.Dev. Mean Std.Dev. 
ROS 9.263 17.123 9.958 13.485 8.169 21.603 
ROA 15.914 90.332 17.411 113.772 13.556 24.817 
Added value per employee 41.866 55.404 40.836 65.098 43.487 35.008 
Sales 250.129 1270.229 176.668 898.876 365.843 1691.357 
Leverage 0.119 0.151 0.120 0.147 0.117 0.157 
Liquidity 15.597 180.141 13.530 36.139 18.852 285.480 
Average degree of capacity utilization 82.165 14.554 82.908 14.182 80.995 15.049 
Temporality ratio 0.166 0.208 0.179 0.213 0.147 0.199 
Market addressed by firm is       
(dummy variables):       
Increasing 0.265 0.441 0.279 0.449 0.243 0.429 
Constant 0.597 0.490 0.597 0.491 0.598 0.490 
Diminishing 0.138 0.345 0.124 0.330 0.159 0.366 
Market in recession (dummy variable) 0.181 0.385 0.161 0.368 0.211 0.408 
R&D (dummy variable) 0.614 0.487 0.644 0.479 0.565 0.496 
Diversification (dummy variable) 0.210 0.408 0.203 0.402 0.222 0.416 
Internationalization (dummy variable) 0.461 0.499 0.436 0.496 0.501 0.500 
Sample size   17,645   10,793   6,852 
Number of firms     2,503     1,449   1,054 
 
Notes: “Sales” are measured in millions of euros. “Added value per employee” is measured in thousands 
of euros 
Source: Spanish Survey of Business Strategies (ESEE, 1993-2005)
Table 2. Estimation results on performance measures (downsizers versus non-
downsizers) 
 
Model 1: 
Return on sales 
Model 2: 
Return on assets 
Model 3: Added value 
per employee 
Determinants Coef. Std. Err. Sig. Coef. Std. Err. Sig. Coef. Std. Err. Sig. 
Constant -1.169 4.969   10.011 5.587 * 53.800 3.281 *** 
Sales 0.000 0.000 * 0.001 0.001   0.004 0.000 *** 
Downsized in previous year (1=yes) -0.045 0.220   -3.136 1.427 ** 0.336 0.838  
Liquidity -1.608 0.999   -7.826 4.565 * 0.001 0.002  
Leverage 0.000 0.001   0.000 0.004   -14.981 2.680 *** 
Average degree of capacity utilization 0.149 0.011 *** 0.127 0.049 *** 0.144 0.029 *** 
Temporality rate 0.697 0.716   3.133 3.419   -29.458 2.007 *** 
Market addressed by firm is (dummy 
variable):            
Increasing            
Constant -0.523 0.267 * -4.885 1.613 *** -0.975 0.947  
Diminishing -0.856 0.413 ** -6.799 2.561 *** -2.718 1.504 * 
Market in recession (1=yes) -1.195 0.339 *** -3.099 2.082   -3.966 1.223 *** 
R&D (dummy variable) -0.866 0.383 ** -0.472 1.580   -10.664 0.928 *** 
Diversification (dummy variable) -0.671 0.442   -2.699 2.025   -2.239 1.189 * 
Internationalization (dummy variable) 0.494 0.391   -2.918 1.506 * 5.769 0.884 *** 
Industry            
Meat Products -7.662 6.026   -2.700 4.530   -10.808 2.660 *** 
Tobacco and Food            
Drinks -2.255 5.397   1.450 5.257   27.690 3.086 *** 
Textile Products 5.978 6.510   -3.011 3.067   -14.065 1.801 *** 
Leather and Shoes -6.056 9.055   5.320 4.590   -15.752 2.695 *** 
Wood Products -0.475 7.892   -2.347 4.766   -11.480 2.798 *** 
Paper Products -8.262 7.258   -2.625 4.450   2.564 2.612  
Publishing and Graphic Arts -5.029 6.269   1.772 3.719   0.044 2.183  
Chemical Products -0.917 4.676   7.962 3.380 ** 9.593 1.985 *** 
Plastic materials and Rubber -3.745 5.871   -0.252 3.613   -5.876 2.121 *** 
Non-metallic minerals -5.263 15.559   -1.844 3.357   0.316 1.971  
Metallurgy -4.285 6.748   -2.124 4.268   6.750 2.506 *** 
Metallic Products -4.872 6.180   -0.520 3.095   -4.596 1.817 ** 
Machinery & mechanical equipment -2.471 6.194   -1.346 3.341   -7.986 1.962 *** 
Office machinery & computing 
equipment 0.328 6.862   -0.780 5.972   -11.654 3.506 *** 
Electric machinery & equipment -7.417 6.554   -1.730 3.612   -7.883 2.121 *** 
Motor vehicles -4.478 6.348   -2.994 3.871   -11.225 2.273 *** 
Other transportation equipment 0.562 8.189   -8.859 5.341 * -6.863 3.136 ** 
Furniture -1.532 6.514   -2.209 3.780   -15.099 2.219 *** 
Other manufacturing industries -1.501 7.236   2.798 5.001   -9.359 2.936 *** 
σu 25.759           
σv 12.353           
ρ; F-test for ρ=0 0.813 6.84  ***        
F ---     1.960  *** 39.520  *** 
Number of observations 17,645    17,645    17,645   
Number of firms 2,503     2,503     2,503     
Notes: Estimation also includes dummies for the years (1993-2005). p<0.10; ** p<0.05; *** p<0.01 
 Table 3.  Estimation results on performance measures (firms that downsize at least 
10% versus firms that do not) 
 Model 1: Return on sales Model 2: Return on assets 
Model 3: Added value per 
employee 
Determinants Coef. Std. Err. Sig. Coef. Std. Err. Sig. Coef. Std. Err. Sig. 
Constant -1.216 4.967   8.616 5.552   54.140 3.259 *** 
Sales 0.000 0.000 * 0.001 0.001   0.004 0.000 *** 
Downsized 10% in previous year 
(1=yes) 0.134 0.294   -1.006 1.947   -1.090 1.143  
Liquidity 0.000 0.001   0.000 0.004   0.001 0.002  
Leverage -1.619 0.999   -7.772 4.570 * -14.877 2.682 *** 
Average degree of capacity utilization 0.149 0.011 *** 0.131 0.049 ** 0.142 0.029 *** 
Temporality rate 0.682 0.716   3.727 3.418   -29.404 2.006 *** 
Market addressed by firm is (dummy 
variable):            
Increasing            
Constant -0.521 0.267 * -4.979 1.613 *** -0.955 0.947  
Diminishing -0.858 0.413 ** -6.938 2.562 *** -2.649 1.504 * 
Market in recession (1=yes) -1.195 0.339 *** -3.174 2.082 0.127 -3.952 1.222 *** 
R&D (dummy variable) -0.870 0.383 ** -0.271 1.582   -10.624 0.929 *** 
Diversification (dummy variable) -0.672 0.442   -2.754 2.025   -2.224 1.189 * 
Internationalization (dummy variable) 0.493 0.391   -3.097 1.506 ** 5.750 0.884 *** 
Industry            
Meat Products -7.685 6.026   -2.700 4.531   -10.802 2.660 *** 
Tobacco and Food            
Drinks -2.249 5.397   1.076 5.255   27.735 3.085 *** 
Textile Products 5.969 6.510   -3.091 3.067   -14.015 1.801 *** 
Leather and Shoes -6.023 9.054   5.382 4.591   -15.719 2.695 *** 
_ord Products -0.433 7.893   -2.215 4.766   -11.470 2.798 *** 
Paper Products -8.250 7.258   -2.673 4.451   2.529 2.613  
Publishing and Graphic Arts -5.017 6.269   1.824 3.720   -0.004 2.184  
Chemical Products -0.922 4.676   7.962 3.381 ** 9.559 1.985 *** 
Plastic materials and Rubber -3.726 5.871   -0.200 3.613   -5.895 2.121 *** 
Non-metallic minerals -5.371 15.560   -2.012 3.356   0.321 1.970  
Metallurgy -4.280 6.748   -2.342 4.268   6.739 2.506 *** 
Metallic Products -4.867 6.180   -0.461 3.095   -4.614 1.817 ** 
Machinery & mechanical equipment -2.459 6.193   -1.342 3.342   -7.980 1.962 *** 
Office machinery & computing 
equipment 0.331 6.861   -0.654 5.973   -11.622 3.506 *** 
Electric machinery & equipment -7.407 6.554   -1.763 3.612   -7.856 2.121 *** 
Motor vehicles -4.475 6.348   -3.059 3.872   -11.239 2.273 *** 
Other transportation equipment 0.599 8.189   -9.237 5.339 ** -6.785 3.134 ** 
Furniture -1.498 6.514   -2.184 3.781   -15.089 2.219 *** 
Other manufacturing industries -1.502 7.236   2.952 5.001   -9.341 2.936 *** 
σu 25.766           
σv 12.353           
ρ; F-test for ρ=0 0.813 6.850 ***        
F ---    1.860  *** 39.540  *** 
Number of observations 17,645    17,645    17,645   
Number of firms 2,503     2,503     2,503     
Notes: Estimation also includes dummies for the years (1993-2005). * p<0.10; ** p<0.05; *** p<0.01 
 
 APPENDIX. 
Table 1. Main descriptive statistics. Whole sample and sub-samples (firms that 
downsize at least 10% and firms that do not ) 
 Do not downsize at least 10% Downsize at least 10% 
 Mean Std. Dev. Mean Std. Dev. 
ROS 9.648 14.690 7.081 26.952 
ROA 16.145 97.024 14.603 32.478 
Added value per employee 43.080 58.576 34.983 31.082 
Sales 270.952 1354.550 132.148 585.905 
Leverage 0.116 0.147 0.136 0.173 
Liquidity 13.725 36.550 26.204 456.819 
Average degree of capacity utilization 82.661 14.184 79.354 16.215 
Temporality ratio 0.160 0.200 0.204 0.246 
Market addressed by firm is     
(dummy variables):     
Increasing 0.270 0.444 0.237 0.425 
Constant 0.601 0.490 0.577 0.494 
Diminishing 0.129 0.335 0.187 0.390 
Market in recession (dummy variable) 0.173 0.378 0.226 0.418 
R&D (dummy variable) 0.593 0.491 0.731 0.444 
Diversification (dummy variable) 0.210 0.407 0.213 0.410 
Internationalization  (dummy variable) 0.480 0.500 0.355 0.479 
Sample size   14,998   2,647 
Number of firms    1,991     512 
 
Notes: “Sales” are measured in millions of euros. “Added value per employee” is measured in thousands 
of euros 
Source: Spanish Survey of Business Strategies (ESEE, 1993-2005) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 Table 2. Estimation results on performance measures in the second year following 
downsizing 
 
Model 1: Return on 
sales 
 
Model 2: Return on 
assets 
 
Model 3: Added value 
per employee 
Determinants Coef. Std. Err. Sig. Coef. Std. Err. Sig. Coef. Std. Err. Sig. 
Constant -4.210 4.569  10.048 6.311  54.122 3.659 *** 
Sales 0.000 0.000  0.001 0.001  0.004 0.000 *** 
Downsized two years before (1=yes) -0.024 0.231  -2.546 1.631  0.045 0.946  
Liquidity -0.267 1.088  -7.711 5.300  0.001 0.002  
Leverage 0.001 0.002  0.000 0.004  -17.410 3.073 *** 
Average degree of capacity utilization 0.147 0.012 *** 0.123 0.057 ** 0.149 0.033 *** 
Temporality rate 0.135 0.781  3.161 3.992  -31.007 -2.315 *** 
Market addressed by firm is (dummy 
variable):            
Increasing - -  - -   - -  
Constant -0.368 0.282  -5.488 1.841 *** -0.747 1.067  
Diminishing -0.793 0.443 * -7.250 2.969 ** -2.330 1.721  
Market in recession (1=yes) -0.744 0.370 ** -2.783 2.439  -4.700 1.414 *** 
R&D (dummy variable) -0.819 0.413 ** -0.686 1.800  -11.252 -1.043 *** 
Diversification (dummy variable) -1.058 0.468 ** -3.047 2.320  -2.503 1.345 * 
Internationalization (dummy variable) 0.288 0.419  -3.381 1.717 ** 6.032 0.995 *** 
Industry            
Meat Products -4.921 6.185  -2.097 5.149  -10.987 2.985 *** 
Tobacco and Food - -   - -   - -  
Drinks -2.165 5.591  2.579 6.031  30.159 3.496 *** 
Textile Products 2.359 6.921  -1.808 3.495  -13.561 2.026 *** 
Leather and Shoes -0.773 9.262  5.139 5.376  -17.347 3.117 *** 
Wood Products 3.994 8.208  -0.501 5.486  -11.527 3.181 *** 
Paper Products -3.615 7.408  -1.635 5.053  2.754 2.930  
Publishing and Graphic Arts -1.618 6.374  2.618 4.240  0.095 2.458  
Chemical Products -0.476 4.718  10.018 3.847 *** 9.797 2.230 *** 
Plastic materials and Rubber 1.498 5.967  0.797 4.120  -6.348 2.388 *** 
Non-metallic minerals - -   -0.703 3.804  0.371 2.205  
Metallurgy 1.336 6.951  -1.236 4.850  7.595 2.812 *** 
Metallic Products 0.009 6.323  0.390 3.536  -4.332 2.050 ** 
Machinery & mechanical equipment 3.675 6.329  -0.266 3.792  -7.655 2.198 *** 
Office machinery & computing 
equipment -2.284 7.110  0.499 6.844  -12.546 3.968 *** 
Electric machinery & equipment -2.419 6.733  -0.892 4.119  -8.451 2.388 *** 
Motor vehicles 1.134 6.479  -1.846 4.413  -11.205 2.559 *** 
Other transportation equipment 5.814 8.260  -8.094 6.078  -5.874 3.524 * 
Furniture 3.422 6.808  -1.503 4.298  -15.253 2.492 *** 
Other manufacturing industries 1.198 7.375  2.426 5.698  -9.495 3.303 *** 
σu 12.463           
σv 12.055           
ρ; F-test for ρ=0 0.517 3.62 ***        
F ---    1.60    32.89   
Number of observations 15,364    15,364    15,364   
Number of firms 2,284     2,284     2,284     
Notes: Estimation also includes dummy for the years (1993-2005); p<0.10; ** p<0.05; *** p<0.01 
 Table 3. Estimation results on performance measures in the 2
nd
 year following downsizing 
(firms that downsize more than 10%) 
 
Return on sales 
 
Return on assets 
 Added value per employee 
Determinants Coef. Std. Err. Sig. Coef. Std. Err. Sig. Coef. Std. Err. Sig. 
Constant -2.240 1.191 * 8.934 6.282  54.454 3.642 *** 
Sales 0.000 0.000  0.001 0.001  0.004 0.000 *** 
Downsized 10% two years before (1=yes) 0.032 0.297  -0.207 2.220  -1.638 1.287  
Liquidity 0.000 0.001  0.000 0.004  0.001 0.002  
Leverage -1.814 0.923 ** -7.754 5.307  -17.222 3.076 *** 
Average degree of capacity utilization 0.134 0.010 *** 0.125 0.057 ** 0.148 0.033 *** 
Temporality rate 0.499 0.680  3.674 3.982  -30.911 2.308 *** 
Market addressed by firm is (dummy variable):            
Increasing - -  - -   - -  
Constant -0.553 0.266 ** -5.583 1.840 *** -0.732 1.067  
Diminishing -1.334 0.419 *** -7.368 2.968 ** -2.297 1.721  
Market in recession (1=yes) -1.089 0.348 *** -2.829 2.439  -4.681 1.414 *** 
R&D (dummy variable) -1.059 0.338 *** -0.556 1.802  -11.172 1.044 *** 
Diversification (dummy variable) -0.758 0.408 * -3.053 2.320  -2.500 1.345 * 
Internationalization (dummy variable) 0.328 0.334  -3.487 1.718 ** 5.969 0.996 *** 
Industry            
Meat Products -3.108 1.520 ** -2.102 5.149  -10.993 2.985 *** 
Tobacco and Food - -   - -   - -  
Drinks 8.055 1.697 *** 2.253 6.028  30.148 3.494 *** 
Textile Products -1.871 1.018 * -1.859 3.495  -13.536 2.026 *** 
Leather and Shoes -1.076 1.514  5.204 5.376  -17.324 3.117 *** 
Wood Products 0.171 1.510  -0.461 5.487  -11.472 3.181 *** 
Paper Products 1.086 1.474  -1.640 5.054  2.679 2.930  
Publishing and Graphic Arts 2.385 1.201 ** 2.703 4.241  0.025 2.459  
Chemical Products 1.303 1.083  10.021 3.848 *** 9.741 2.230 *** 
Plastic materials and Rubber 1.465 1.144  0.821 4.120  -6.351 2.388 *** 
Non-metallic minerals 3.258 1.137 *** -0.817 3.803  0.361 2.205  
Metallurgy 0.285 1.371  -1.416 4.849  7.545 2.811 *** 
Metallic Products 0.289 0.988  0.424 3.536  -4.348 2.050 ** 
Machinery & mechanical equipment -0.518 1.061  -0.298 3.792  -7.656 2.198 *** 
Office machinery & computing equipment -1.490 1.782  0.641 6.845  -12.490 3.968 *** 
Electric machinery & equipment -1.052 1.156  -0.900 4.119  -8.442 2.388 *** 
Motor vehicles -0.480 1.212  -1.913 4.414  -11.239 2.559 *** 
Other transportation equipment -9.814 1.758 *** -8.481 6.074  -5.784 3.521  
Furniture -1.020 1.202  -1.443 4.298  -15.254 2.492 *** 
Other manufacturing industries 1.449 1.637  2.540 5.698  -9.476 3.303 *** 
σu 9.575           
σv 12.055           
ρ 0.387           
F ---    1.55    32.93   
R2     0.0042    0.0828   
Number of observations 15,364    15,364    15,364   
Number of firms 2,284     2,284     2,284     
Notes: Estimation also includes dummy for the years (1993-2005); p<0.10; ** p<0.05; *** p<0.01 
 
  
 
                                                           
i
 The American Management Association, which has conducted a series of large scale studies on 
downsizing, found that most companies fell short of the objectives they had originally established, and 
that nearly half of the firms were “badly” or “not well” prepared for the process (reported in Cascio, 
1993:97-99; see also De Meuse et al., 1994). 
 
ii
 We must take into account that these constraints on the hiring and firing of workers are not entirely 
transparent, since, in addition to national laws, collective agreements between employers and workers 
organization also are very important in regulating the adjustment of the labour factor —these agreements 
may differ across industries and workers (depending upon age, tenure, etc.).  
 
iii
 These complements for the pension negotiated within the collective dismissal process may explain, for 
instance, that in the year 2001, 55 percent of the newly retired individuals in the General Regime of the 
Social Security were below 65 years-old, and 29 percent were below 60 years-old. In fact, for such a year, 
21,712 individuals took up early retirement before the age of 65 after exhausting unemployment benefits 
—Spanish Labour Force Survey, fourth quarter, 2001 (INE). 
 
iv
 This definition conveys the usual idea of intentionality found in the downsizing literature, since (i) it 
excludes temporary employees (which is the convention) and (ii) includes layoffs, redundancies and early 
retirements. Thus, if despite implementing layoffs of permanent workers in a particular year the company 
ends up with an increase in the size of the permanent workforce (due to hiring new permanent workers), 
this situation is not considered as downsizing, according to our definition. Defining downsizing as the 
(net) reduction in the permanent work force is coincident with that used, among others, by Tang et al. 
(1995), Appelbaum et al. (1987), Lewis et al. (1996) or American Management Association (1998). 
 
v
 According to the Hausman test, the fixed-effects panel estimation was preferred to the random-effects 
estimation in one of the models (Model 1 in Tables 2, 3 and Table 1 in the Appendix), while the random-
effects model was preferred versus the fixed-effects model in Model 1 in Table 3 in the Appendix. In the 
remainder of the models, the pooled estimation  (i.e, where no consideration for the panel nature of the 
dataset is done) was preferred. 
